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Abstract—With the increasing adoption of location based
services, privacy is becoming a major concern. To hide the
identity and location of a request on location based service, most
methods consider a set of users in a reasonable region so as
to confuse their requests. When there are not enough users,
the cloaking region needs expanding to a larger area or the
response needs delay. Either way degrades the quality-of-service.
In this paper, we tackle the privacy problem in a predication way
by recommending a privacy-preserving path for a requester.We
consider the popular navigation application, where users may
continuously query different location based servers during their
movements. Based on a set of metrics on privacy, distance and the
quality of services that a LBS requester often desires, a secure
path is computed for each request according to user’s preference,
and can be dynamically adjusted when the situation is changed.
A set of experiments are performed to verify our method and
the relationship between parameters are discussed in details. We
also discuss how to apply our method into practical applications.
Keywords—Location privacy, navigation, predication
I. INTRODUCTION
With the continued advances in mobile networks and posi-
tioning technologies, location based services (LBS) are widely
adopted in daily life[8], [11]. For example, drive navigation is
a very popular application [9]. In this process, a user may con-
tinuously report his current location to a service provider and
query real-time road or trafﬁc information so as to ﬁnd a fast
path to the destination [4]. In these applications, privacy is an
important issue. An adversary may obtain unauthorized access
to raw location data on LBS servers and identify the subject
using the positioning device. Having knowledge of users’
location related information, malicious parties can reason out
more information about users’ habits, and health conditions
etc. for further business initiatives or political purposes.
Previous protection on location privacy is processed by
LBS providers and is enforced according to user deﬁned
privacy policies [5]. Here LBS users have to trust a LBS server
that their locations and identity information can be adequately
protected. However, in some cases, a LBS provider may use
users’ information for improper purpose or leak users’ query
messages to other parties for some commercial reason.
To solve the problem of untrusted LBS servers, a trusted
third-party, anonymity server, is introduced between LBS
servers and users, as well as the channel between users and the
anonymity server is assumed secure[7]. In this scenario, when
a LBS query occurs, the trusted anonymity server performs
some preprocessing, such as confusing the real user identity
with anonym or hiding his/her exact position with a cloaking
square, so as to blur the link between a query and the user’s
identity. Then it transmits the query to a LBS server. When the
response is returned from the LBS server, the anonymity server
transfers it to the intended users. In this process, LBS users
can not be identiﬁed even though the location and identity
information in queries are acquired by adversaries.
Based on this architecture, the k−anonymity is regarded
as a typical criterion to evaluate the extent of privacy protection
[16], [17]. When a user requests from a LBS server which
may be not credible, the trusted anonymity server computes
a cloaking region that contains the user and at least k − 1
other neighbors. The sender’s accurate position is then replaced
with a coarser spatial range and the sender is indistinguishable
with them such that the adversary will have uncertainty in
matching each exact user to a known location-identity associ-
ation. Another representative method under this architecture is
mix− zone, which is a speciﬁc region where users’ accurate
identities are mixed and hidden from adversaries’ deduction
[15]. When users need to protect their location based privacy,
they enter mix-zones. This solution also requires a number of
LBS users in a mix-zone.
However, the assumption in the above architecture that
enough users locate in the cloaking region can not be satisﬁed
all the time in real life. When there are less users in a
considered area, location privacy of LBS users may be com-
promised. The current remediation extends the k−anonymity
criterion from both spatial and temporal aspects [7]. The spatial
cloaking takes a larger geographical range so that enough users
are included, while the temporal cloaking delays the response
to a query for a period of time so as to wait for enough
number of users. Either way degrades the quality of LBS
service (QoS). Especially in the scenario of path navigation,
users may continuously send LBS queries or send different
queries on any point of the path. The low quality of location
based services would deviate users’ intentions.
In this paper, we tackle the privacy problem in the popular
navigation applications in a different way. Based on a series of
metrics on privacy, distance, and the quality of services that a
LBS requester often desires, we introduce the notion of secure
path. The proposed algorithm recommends a path for each
request based on the current situation and user preferences such
that on each step of the path user’s privacy is preserved under
the k− anonymity criterion. When the situation on next step
is changed insecure during user movement, the recommended
secure path is dynamically adjusted. The core of our method
is to provide a LBS user more privacy without degradation of
QoS if he/she moves along the recommended path rather than
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a random movement. Although a preliminary version of this
idea was presented in [10], this paper makes a comprehensive
extension in four aspects: the integration of secure and insecure
situation, formal veriﬁcation, a series of evaluation metric and
thorough experiments, and a k − free discussion on how to
apply our method into practical applications.
Other related works include privacy proteciton in pub-
lishing historical trajectories, which sanitize the original data
and group similar trajectories for publishing[2]. For example,
the local suppression method achieves a tailored privacy for
trajectory data anonymization[3]. The purpose of these studies
is to anonymize a speciﬁc user trajectory with other users in
the same group while preserve an extent of utility. It does not
solve the privacy problem in real time queries. Although the
algorithm in [18] concerns the privacy in route predication, it
focus on predicating a user destination by analyzing historical
trajectories and notifying a user whether the next position is
secure for LBS request. It does not recommend a user how to
choose a privacy preserving path for continuous LBS requests.
Our work also seems related to path planning. However, path
planning algorithms traditionally focus on desirable paths,
which are usually measured by travel distance or time[12].
They do not integrate privacy concern.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we give the framework of path planning based privacy protec-
tion and the path predication algorithm. Then we present the
evaluation metrics in Section III, as well as the experimental
study. We then discuss how to balance the preferences on
privacy and distance in section IV. Conclusions and future
works are presented in section V.
II. THE PRIVACY PRESERVING MODEL
We adopt the widely used trusted third-party architecture
for preserving users’ location privacy. Our work resides on
the anonymity server (A-Server for short) and focuses on the
popular navigation applications, which is adaptive to other re-
lated LBS with the characteristics of movement and continuous
queries as well. When there is a navigation request along with
a start point and a destination, the anonymity server invokes the
path planning algorithm to ﬁnd a privacy-preserving path for
the requester. If the state of user’s next step becomes insecure
during movement, A-Server would ﬁnd another secure path
for the rest distance to his destination. In this process, a user
is allowed to specify his personalized preferences on privacy
and distance, such as an integer k as the k − anonymity
criterion or a detour rate on how far is acceptable for him
to detour comparing to the geographically nearest path. In the
following sections, we ﬁrstly narrate our method under the
k − anonymity criterion and then discuss how the k setting
can be ignored by real users in practice.
A. Basic Terminology
The considered geographical region is described as a mesh
or grid, denoted as Mesh. Each cell of the mesh is regarded as
a cloak region when a user requests a location-based service.
Each cell i has a pair of coordinates ci(x, y) denoting the top-
left point of this cell. The resolution of a mesh is the number
of cells on it, denoted as |Mesh|. This manner of deﬁning
geographical region is often used in a geographic information
system (GIS) to capture, store, manipulate, analyze, manage,
and present different types of geographically referenced data
[6]. It is easily reducible and enlargeable in practice. Positions
from a global navigation satellite system like Global Position-
ing System (GPS) can be collected and then imported into a
GIS. The coordinates of each cell can be mapped to the latitude
and longitude in geography science. The status of a cell i refers
to the number of LBS users in this region, denoted as ηi. The
mesh situation refers to the distribution of the whole set of LBS
users in the considered area. If there is a lake or a mountain
in a map, the corresponding cells are marked as obstacles.
A path on Mesh is a sequence of cells from a start position
to a destination. Formally, path = {c1, c2, · · · , cl}, where l
is an integer denoting the length of the path (L(path)), ci ∈
Mesh, i ∈ [i..l], is a cell and ci(xi, yi) and ci+1(xi+1, yi+1)
satisfy either |xi+1 − xi| = 1 or |yi+1 − yi| = 1.
According to the semantics of k − anonymity criterion,
users are regarded secure if there are at least k users in the
cloak region. The purpose of an attacker is to identify a LBS
requester from an observed set of LBS users in a cloak region.
In essence, the privacy of each user in a cloak region is
computed as the uncertainty of an adversary in linking him to a
requester. Since all users look identical within the anonymous
user set, the probability of successful linking is 1/ηi, where
ηi is the number of users in the cloak region. Since entropy is
widely adopted to quantify the uncertainty[13], we use entropy
to evaluate user privacy in a cloaking region.
H(ci) = −
ηi∑
i=1
(1/ηi ∗ log2(1/ηi)) = log2(ηi) (1)
Intuitively, the more users in a cell, the higher entropy of the
cell and user privacy. Different with a snapshot LBS query, the
privacy of continuous LBS queries along with user movement
requires the whole path is secure under k − anonymity. So,
we introduce the concepts of cell privacy and path privacy.
Deﬁnition 1: [cell k-anonymity privacy] Given a mesh
Mesh and an integer k for the k − anonymity criterion, the
k − anonymity privacy of a cell ci ∈ Mesh is deﬁned as:
Hk(ci) =
{
log2(k), ηi ≥ k
log2(ηi), 1 < ηi < k
0, ηi ≤ 1
(2)
where ηi is the number of LBS users in ci.
The semantics of the above deﬁnition is that when the
number of users in a cell equals or is larger than k, the privacy
of the users in the cell remains the same, denoted as HK . This
shows the fact that under the k − anonymity criterion, the
users are regarded privacy preserving in such cases, and the
cell is called secure as well. Actually, this criteria makes a
balance between privacy and quality of LBS service. Although
a higher k guarantees better privacy, it generally requires a
larger cloaking region to cover k LBS users, which may reduce
request resolution and result in coarse results.
Deﬁnition 2: [user request] Given a mesh Mesh, a
user navigation request is in the form of 4-tuple <
uid, St,Des, k >, where uid is the identiﬁer of the requester,
St ∈ Mesh, and Des ∈ Mesh respectively represent the
user’s current position and destination, k is an integer denoting
the user’s privacy preference for k − anonymity criterion.
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Our purpose is to ﬁnd a k− anonymity secure path pt =
{c1, c2, · · · , cl} for a user request such that each cell ci, i ∈
[1..l] is k−anonymity secure. The path privacy is then deﬁned
as the overall evaluation of cell privacy on the path.
B. The Proposed Algorithm
In this section, we present the personalized privacy-
preserving path planning algorithm. A LBS user is allowed
to specify an integer k as his privacy preference with respect
to k − anonymity criterion. The path planning is a dynamic
process along with the periodical update of mesh situation in
real time. When solving the personalized path planning prob-
lem, we ﬁnd there are quiet a few considerations similar to the
robot movement problem in a partially known environment
(RMP for short) [14].The partially known environment in RMP
is similar to the dynamic update of mesh situation and the
target of ﬁnding a sequence of points from some initial point
to destination in RMP is also similar to the path planning
in our problem. Since the robot movement problem has been
well studied and there are many efﬁcient algorithms on solving
it, we reduce our problem to it rather than to design a speciﬁc
algorithm so as to beneﬁt from the existing results.
The representative D∗ algorithm for solving RMP consists
of two stages: global planning and local planning [14]. Given
a partially known map, it ﬁrstly invokes global planning
according to the present map situation, namely ﬁnding a
sequence of cells that a user can go through. Since the current
map is partially known, the path calculated initially may not
be exact and the local planning makes some necessary path
adjustment. When the user moves forward along the path, the
next state on the path is available. When encountering with
some obstacle, the path would be re-planned according to the
updated map state. Accordingly, our solution consists of the
initial phase and the adjustment phase. For a LBS user request
< uid, St,Des, k >, it ﬁnds a secure path from St to Des
such that each cell on the path is secure with respect to k and
the total cost of the path is optimal.
However, there also exist some distinctions between our
problem and the RMP problem. The most important is that we
need to consider privacy besides distance. Another difference is
the dynamic environment. Obstacles on a map are ﬁxed about
path planning, while in our problem cell state may change
any time during user movement, i.e. from insecure to secure
or in a reverse way. Finally, the deﬁnition of a path length is
different. So, we need to make some tricks on the reduction so
as to satisfy both RMP requirements and our considerations.
The details of reduction are given below.
Cell Cost and Path Cost: each cell is assigned a cost
according to mesh situation and is used in calculating a path
in RMP . Since the core on choosing a path in our problem
is the guarantee of path privacy, we select each secure cell
on the path and discard insecure cells. To map to the arc
cost requirements in RMP , we set a small positive cost to
k − anonymity secure cells and a positive inﬁnity cost (i.e.
a large enough integer) to insecure cells. An example of such
setting can be as cost(ci) = 1 on each secure cell ci and
cost(ci) = 1000 on each insecure cell. Path Cost is the
sum of cell cost on path. It is calculated by the predicate
Costpath(pi, pj) =
∑
x∈path(pi,pj) cost(x), denoting the es-
timated cost of the path from cell pi to pj .
Cell Mark and Path Calculation. The considered geograph-
ic region is described as a mesh mapping to the map in RMP .
Each cell on the mesh is associated with a mark belonging to
the set {New,Closed,Open} denoting whether the cell has
been visited, still active or closed. If a cell is never visited,
its state is set New. A visited secure cell marked with open
denotes that it is active and is regarded as a candidate for a
secure path, while a visited but insecure cell or an obstacle
cell (like a lake or a region not being allowed to enter) is
marked with Closed so as to prevent a loop detour. We adopt
a linked list to record all the cells on a recommended path
for each request < uid, St,Des, k >. The initial estimated
cost of a path estimatedpath(St,Des) is calculated accord-
ing to the current mesh situation. Since the mesh situation
may change any time, the cost of path via some point pi
is updated as Costpath(St, pi, Des) = Costpath(St, pi) +
estimatedpath(pi, Des), where Costpath(St, pi) is the real
distance between St and pi that a user has moved through.
After invoking the D∗ Algorithm, we get a secure path for
recommendation.
In practice, the algorithm records a table of recommended
paths for recent requests and updates periodically along with
mesh situation or new path generation. When a user request
occurs, the algorithm checks whether there is a similar LBS
request and returns the recent previously planned path. Oth-
erwise, the algorithm would plan a new path for him. As a
user moving along his recommended path, cell states may
change insecure. Then the phase of dynamic path adjustment
is invoked. A new secure path from the current cell to his
destination is recalculated based on the current mesh situation.
When the targetDestination is arrived, the algorithm ﬁnishes.
C. Analyses on the Proposed Method
In this subsection, we would prove the correctness of our
method. To reﬂect user desire on privacy and short distance,
we ﬁrst introduce the concept of dominate relation on path.
Deﬁnition 3: [Dominate Relation] Given a mesh Mesh,
a user request req =< uid, St,Des, k > and two paths
path1 = {c1, c2, · · · , cl1}, path2 = {c′1, c′2, · · · , c′l2} on
Mesh for req, we say that path1 Dom path2 if and only
if one of the following cases holds :
• case 1: path1 is kA−secure while path2 is insecure.
• case 2: path1 and path2 are kA− secure, l1 ≤ l2.
The above deﬁnition actually considers what a user mainly
desires in a navigation request. The ﬁrst case compares a secure
path to an insecure path while the second case compares two
secure paths. We would prove that our method could ﬁnd the
optimal path (if exist).
Lemma 1: For a given mesh Mesh and a user request
req =< uid, St,Des, k >, the proposed algorithm returns a
kA−secure path if there exists, and this path is not dominated
by any other path connecting St and Des.
Proof: We prove this lemma from two aspects. First,
assume there exist a kA− secure path for req under Mesh.
We would prove that the above solution would not return a
path including insecure cells. According to the construction of
cost function, each secure cell is set a small integer (in our
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method it equals to 1) and each insecure cell is set a very
larger integer (e.g.∞). Without loss of generality, we assume
the length of the secure path is l, namely the path cost is
costpath(st, des) = l. Since there is no loop on path, the
path length would not exceed the resolution of Mesh (the
total number of cells in Mesh). However, the cost of a path
covering an insecure cell is deﬁnitely larger than the resolution
and thus is larger than the cost of the secure path. Since the
D∗ algorithm in solving RMP chooses the shortest path, it
would not return a path including an insecure cell.
Then we prove that if there exist more than one kA −
secure paths, our method returns the shortest one. According
to the deﬁnition of path cost and the construction of cost
function, the cost of any kA − secure path equals to its
length. So, the cost of the short secure path is less than that of
the longer secure path. The D∗ algorithm returns the shortest
kA− secure path.
D. Handling Exception
In case there does not exist a k − anonymity secure
path for a user’s request, say a very large k evaluates every
cell insecure, the algorithm will notify the user for a smaller
k or recommend a constructive path with less privacy risk.
Accordingly, the concept of cell risk is introduced as a part
of cell cost so as to integrate the secure state and the insecure
state together in computing path.
Cell Risk. Given a mesh Mesh and an integer k, cell risk
is deﬁned as the privacy difference between the insecure cell
against a k − anonymity secure cell, namely Risk(ci) =
HK −Hk(ηi), where HK = log2k and ηi is the number LBS
users in cell ci. Cell risk describes how much information an
attacker learns from the decrease of k to ηi. For normalization
purpose, we introduce the risk degree of cell i:
γi =
Risk(ci)
HK
= 1− H
k(ci)
HK
(3)
Since k > 1, γi always lies within [0..1] and γi = 0 holds if
ci is k − anonymity secure cell. The case γi = 1 indicates
only one user in cell i and he/she can be recognized with
probability 1. To overall consider distance and cell state, cell
cost is extended as:
Cost(ci) =
{
1 : ηi ≥ k
B + γi ∗RMax : otherwise (4)
where B ≥ 1 and RMax ≥ 0 are parameters denoting how
cell risk inﬂuences the path planning.
The ﬁrst part B means a basic assignment to an insecure
cell. Since cell cost is used as the distance in the path planning
algorithm, insecure cell cost should be larger than secure
cell cost, i.e. B ≥ 1. The second part illustrates that the
cost scales with the risk of cell insecure state. The setting
of these parameters would inﬂuence the ﬁnal generated path.
Intuitively, increasing B indicates a user’s preference on more
privacy rather than detour on path. For example, when setting
B = ∞, only secure cells are chosen as candidates on the path.
In case there is not a kA−secure path for a request and a path
recommendation is still desired, a less risky path can be found
by setting an appropriate RMax. A larger RMax ampliﬁes
the differences between risky cells. When setting RMax = 0,
all insecure cells are regarded same.
In practice, it is difﬁcult for a user to choose an appropriate
k for his privacy preference. Instead, he may express his prefer-
ence as either a higher secure rate or overall path privacy. The
algorithm can satisﬁes users’ preferences by accommodating
these parameters. We would discuss what parameter settings
are appropriate for a user’s preference under current mesh
situation in following sections. .
III. EVALUATION METRIC AND EXPERIMENTS
A. Evaluation Metric
Success rate (Suc Rt): Given a mesh Mesh, an integer k
for the k−anonymity criterion and a path = {c1, c2, · · · , cl},
where l is a positive integer, the success rate is the ratio of
the number of secure cells on path (denoted as Nsec(path))
to the path length. Formally,
Suc Rtpath = Nsec(path)/l (5)
It describes how well the k−anonymity criteria is satisﬁed
on this path. We also adopt the Ninsecure(path) to denote the
number of insecure cells on the path.
k-anonymity path privacy (kA-Privacy). Given a mesh
Mesh, a path path = {c1, c2, · · · , cl} onMesh and an integer
k for the k − anonymity criterion, the kA− Privacy of the
path is the average of cell k-anonymity privacy. Formally,
Hk(path) = 1
l
∗
l∑
i=1
Hk(ci) (6)
Comparing to the metric of success rate, kA − Privacy
is a more ﬁne-grained evaluation of path privacy. Especially
when there does not exist a k − anonymity secure path, a
user may choose a path with higher privacy.
In the process of ﬁnding a privacy-preserving path, a detour
may often be encountered, which compromises the navigation
purpose on shortest way. So, a tradeoff sometimes must be
made between the distance and privacy. We introduce the
following metric of detour rate to express the tolerance a user
would like to accept on path detour.
Detour rate(Detour Rate). Given a mesh Mesh, t-
wo cells c1 ∈ Mesh and cl ∈ Mesh, and a path =
{c1, c2, · · · , cl} on Mesh, the Detour Rate is deﬁned as:
Detour Rate =
l − Lspath(c1, cl)
Lspath(c1, cl) (7)
where Lspath(c1, cl) denotes the shortest path length connect-
ing c1 and cl.
Accuracy. The metric of accuracy evaluates the precision
of a location based service, which is determined by the size of
a cloaking region (CR). The smaller a CR, the higher quality
the LBS associated with CR.
In our solution, CR size is determined by the resolution of
a given map. However, from the competitive point of privacy,
a higher resolution would cause fewer users in a cell, which
would result in a lower probability of k−anonymity satisﬁed.
So, in the following sections, we would discuss how to make
a trade-off between these metrics.
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B. Evaluation Benchmark
A benchmark is a set of standards in order to assess
our solution against the metrics. The purposes of introducing
benchmark are, on one side, to evaluate how well our solution
can affect the extent of privacy protection; on the other side, to
understand what a LBS user desires has been sacriﬁced during
this process. So, the selection of benchmark should consider
both positive and negative aspects. In a common sense, when
a user makes a navigation request, the response from a LBS
server ﬁnds the shortest path for him. So, the selection of
distance benchmark should randomly choose a shortest path
on a map without considering privacy. Since Manhattan path
is widely adopted in geographical applications to evaluate the
distance between two intersections in a borough, we adopt
it as the distance benchmark. For a given start point c1 and
a destination point c2, Manhattan distance is deﬁned as
the length of a Manhattan path connecting these two points,
denoted as LMpath(p1, p2).
This Manhattan distance is actually the absolute differences
of the coordinates of the start point and the destination. Since
a Manhattan path resides on the rectangle determined by there
two cells, we call this rectangle the minimum shortest-path
closure (MSC for short). The shortest path length in equation
7 is replaced by the Manhattan distance, namely
Detour Rate =
l − LMpath(p1, p2)
LMpath(p1, p2) (8)
Since a shortest path may randomly cover the cells in
MSC, the privacy attributes of MSC should be chosen as
the benchmark also.It includes the average success rate and
the average k − anonymity privacy, namely
BenSuccess =
Nsec(MSC)
|MSC| (9)
BenPrivacy =
1
|MSC| ∗
∑
ci∈MSC
Hk(ci) (10)
where Nsec(MSC) is the number of secure cells in the MSC
region and |MSC| is the size of MSC.
We would like to mention again that the above selected
benchmarks are based on randomly selected paths connecting
a start and a destination. Based on the above metrics and
benchmarks, we would present and evaluate the proposed
location privacy protection solution in next section.
C. Experimental Study
The experiments were conducted on a desktop with
3.10GHz CPU, 3.16G memory and 500GB disk space installed
the operating system Windows 7. All experimental results are
the average values of more than ten times of program running.
LBS users are randomly distributed on a map.
We ﬁrst quantitatively investigate the relationship between
the quality of LBS and privacy, as shown in Figure 1. This set
of experiments are performed on the same map with a ﬁxed
number of LBS users so as to simulate a practical scenario.
Intuitively, a higher resolution means a smaller cell size and
results in better QoS and less users in a cell. For example,
if the number of users is 10000 and the map resolution is
Fig. 1: The relationship between privacy and QoS
60*60, the average number of users on each cell is about 2.8.
However, if the resolution is ampliﬁed to 120*120, this number
becomes less than 1. In Figure 1, The X axis is the resolution
of the mesh. The left Y axis is the privacy (in the form of
entropy), while the right Y axis is the number of insecure cells
on a path. The solid histograms denote the average privacy of
generated paths and the histograms with slant lines denote the
privacy benchmarks, as deﬁned in equation 10. The broken
lines are the number of insecure cells in a generated path. On
each setting, we perform twenty times and get the average
result. Each invocation denotes a user request under the same
k but with different locations. The results show that with
the increase of map resolution, the average privacy of a path
decreases, while the number of insecure cells increases. We
did not compare the same k under different resolutions since
obviously a larger resolution results fewer users in a cell and
only small k can be satisﬁed. This illustrates that a tradeoff
must be made between the competitive targets of privacy and
quality of LBS. Consider the situation of a ﬁxed resolution,
a higher k results in more insecure cells of a path under the
k−anonymity criterion, namely a lower success rate, but the
average privacy (in entropy) of this path may increase.
Then, we evaluate how the risk parameters B and RMax
inﬂuence the attributes of a selected path. The experiments are
performed on the same map with the mesh size 60*60. A set of
dummy LBS users are randomly distributed on the map, who
take part in the k − anonymity evaluation but without any
navigation request. This assumption has been well discussed
in previous work [1]. The number of dummy users in each cell
ranges from 0 to 9 with the same probability. When k is ﬁxed,
cell states are determined. For example, all the cells associated
with less than 3 users are evaluated insecure when k = 4. The
higher k, the more insecure cells. We analyze the relationship
between the privacy and k setting. Three representative cases
are selected: a lower risk situation k = 2, a middle risk
situation k = 5 and a higher risk situation k = 8. In each
case, we consider three aspects of planned paths: secure rate,
cell kA − privacy and detour rate, as deﬁned in equations
2, 5 and 7 respectively. The benchmark of each attribute is
calculated against the equations 8, 9 and 10, respectively. The
selected B ranges from 1 to 20 and RMax ranges from 0 to
100. The results show that after B ≥ 6 and RMax ≥ 5, the
metrics on privacy and distance remain almost the same.
The experiment results in Figure 2 show that the average
path privacy and secure rate scale well with the increase of B
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(a-1) path privacy on k=3 (a-2) success rate on k=3 (a-3) detour rate on k=3
(b-1) path privacy on k=5 (b-2) success rate on k=5 (b-3) detour rate on k=5
(c-1) path privacy on k=8 (c-2) success rate on k=8 (c-3) detour rate on k=8
Fig. 2: Relationship between parameters
and RMax. They approach a stable value after the parameters
exceed some thresholds, and are better than the benchmark in
all cases. With the increasing k, a user has to detour more for
a higher guarantee on path privacy. Comparing different mesh
situations, the stable values vary with each other. In smaller
k cases, shown as (a-1), (b-1) and (c-1), the stable point of
privacy is smaller while the success rate is higher than in
larger k cases. This is because the planning algorithm has more
opportunities to ﬁnd a secure path under a low k setting; while
a higher k setting causes more cells insecure. Also the average
path privacy scales positively with k increasing because the
planning algorithm tries to ﬁnd a secure or less risky cell on
each step (namely more users). It is easy to understand that, in
case k is ﬁxed and mesh situation is determined, the average
of path privacy is deﬁnitely increasing with the number of
dummy users.
The above analysis shows that under the same mesh situ-
ation, a user’s preference can be satisﬁed by setting different
parameters. If a user prefers a lager secure rate of a path and
would like to accept more detour, B should be set higher. When
a user prefers high average privacy of a path and does not want
to detour more, we should set a smaller B and a larger RMax.
The differences between insecure cells, i.e different ηi, would
inﬂuence path chosen. The reason of not assigning the inﬁnity
to a high risky cell is that sometimes a user has to go through
an insecure cell when there is no other choice.
Next, we study the efﬁciency of our method. In path
predication, the number of cells in a mesh inﬂuences the
average length of paths and cell states determine how many
tries on each step chosen. So, we evaluate how the Mesh
situation inﬂuences the algorithm efﬁciency in two folds: the
size of mesh and the percentage of secure cells for a ﬁxed k in a
mesh, denoted as Rsec(map). The settings in this experiment
are RMax = 5, B = 6, k = 6, and the simulated number
of dummy LBS users on each cell ranges from 0 to 9. The
generated users’ requests are randomly distributed on the map.
As results in Figure 3 (a), the running time scales positive with
the resolution since the algorithm has to plan more steps for a
user request under a high resolution mesh; while it is slightly
decreases with Rsec(mesh) increase. Figure 3 (b) shows how
the efﬁciency scales with the number of total user requests,
denoted as |U |. The resolution in this experiment is 60 ∗ 60.
The results show that the response time scales linearly with
the increase of |U | and the overall time is acceptable.
Finally, we prototype a system on Mac OS X Lion with
Xcode. We adopt the Objective-C programming language to
develop the system and use the application programming
interface (API) on Baidu website to get map, trafﬁc and
points of interest etc. information. Figure 4 is the snapshots of
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(a) example1 (b) example2
Fig. 4: Snapshot of prototype system
the prototype system with two examples of planned path for
different requests. The green color denotes the high private
part while red color indicates less private. Different with the
simulated map, all paths should be along with the exist roads,
which makes less choice. That is why some part of the path
is in red color.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the proposed predication based privacy protection solu-
tion, a user is allowed to specify k as his privacy preference
for path planning. However, in practice a user himself may not
have clear idea on what k is appropriate. If k is set too high,
the success rate of a path is low. On the other side, although
a small k could cause a high path success rate, the overall
privacy may decrease. So, in this section we would discuss
what is a practical choice for high guarantee on privacy.
A. What is an appropriate k setting
From the experimental results in the above section, we can
see that for a given distribution of LBS users in a mesh, setting
k as the average ηi seems a golden mean for general privacy
requirements. The conclusion wholly consider multiple aspects
of path privacy, secure rate and detour rate etc. For example,
if ηi ranges within [0..9], k = 5 makes about half cells on a
mesh secure and the metrics reach a good level. In practical
applications, the anonymity server has the information about
all LBS users’ current locations. After mapping them to a
mesh, the overall distribution of LBS users can be calculated,
namely the number ηi of users on each cell ci. Then k can be
set the central core value of all ηi in path planning, namely
the number of cells with ηi > k approximately equals to the
number of cells with ηi ≤ k.
B. k − free entropy
The initial purpose of k−anonymity criterion is to ensure
the uncertainty of an adversary in linking a certain identity to
a requester. It considers a cloaking region covering not less
than k users such that the probability of successful linking is
less than 1/ηi, where ηi is the number of users in cell ci. The
above discussion is based on this semantics. However, when
there does not exist a kA−secure path for a user request, we
need to revisit the semantics of k − anonymity criterion and
recommend an appropriate path under current mesh situation.
As an alternative way, we propose the k−free entropy criteria
to select a comparatively high private path, which does not
consider any speciﬁc k value. The cost function is constructed
as cost(ci) = RMax ∗ (log2MaxN − log2ηi), where MaxN
is an integer larger than every ηi in the mesh and RMax ≥ 1.
Then the metrics of a generated path are the average of path
privacy E(path) and the standard deviation of path privacy σ:
E(path) =
∑
ci∈path log2ηi
Lpath
σ =
√
Exp(log2ηi − E(path))2
We study the effectiveness of this method and make com-
parison on different k setting, shown in Figure 5 (a). From the
results we can see that the k − free entropy criteria has a
better privacy without much detour rate. Comparing the cases
with similar path privacy, it has a better σ.
C. Make a trade-off between privacy and communication jam
Although satisfying a higher k means more privacy, it may
bring communication jam or heavy trafﬁc. So we propose
the Moderate − Privacy criteria.The descriptive setting is
shown in Figure 5(b). Considering a user’s preferred k or a
recommended Golden k by our system, we choose a window
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(a) k − free entropy
(b) A Moderate k setting
Fig. 5: Discussion
[kl, ku] such that kl < k < ku, where kl and ku are integers,
and the cost function is constructed as following:
Cost(ci) =
{
1 : ηi ∈ [kl, ku]
B1 + γi ∗RMax : ηi ≤ kl
B2 : ηi ≥ ku
(11)
RMax, B1 and B2 are positive numbers that satisfy B1 ≥
B2 ≥ 1. The semantics of such setting is that a moderate
number of users in the anonymous set is enough. On one side,
it can satisfy a user’s privacy preference. On the other side, it
can avoid LBS communication jam or heavy trafﬁc.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Privacy protection is a critical problem in location based
services. Unlike previous works, we investigate this problem
from the predication aspect rather than a user already in
some position. This work is based on the widely adopted
trusted third-party architecture. We investigate the metrics that
a user often desires in continuous LBS queries, which takes an
overview of path privacy rather than a snapshot LBS request
at one position in previous metric. In the proposed privacy
protection model, a user is allowed to specify a value k
and detour rate as preferences on privacy and distance. The
personalized privacy algorithm predicates an optimal path for
a navigation request considering multiple considerations. Our
model also integrates secure and insecure situations. We per-
form thorough experiments to evaluate our proposed method
and the results show that, without degrading the Quality
of Service, our method provides higher privacy than users’
random movement. We also discuss how to apply our method
to practical applications in which users generally do not know
how to choose k and what a k setting exactly means, and show
that our method is suitable for not only the k − anonymity
criterion but also a k − free context.
In the future, we would integrate more considerations
for path recommendation, such as trafﬁc, sightseeing, hotels
etc.We also consider to design and implement a friendly
visual interface on mobile devices so that users can easily
express their preference as well as to have a clear idea on
the effectiveness of their choices.
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